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 Mullā Ṣadrā on the Efficacy of Prayer (du‘ā)1 
 Sayeh Meisami 
 University of Dayton, Ohio 
 
 Abstract 
 This paper presents the manner in which Mullā Ṣadrā explains the influence of prayer 
(du‘ā) on the world, drawing as he does on Ibn ‘Arabī’s ideas against the backdrop of his 
own dynamic metaphysical psychology. Mullā Ṣadrā’s eventually distances himself from 
Ibn Sīnā’s position on the passive nature of prayer, and instead opts for Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
reading of the intimate divine-human interplay in prayer itself. In doing so, Mullā Ṣadrā 
provides a formulation of prayer in which the supplicant plays a more active role in 
eliciting the divine response to her prayer. For Mullā Ṣadrā, prayer therefore fashions the 
human soul, while the human soul also fashions the outcome of prayer. 
Keywords 
Cosmology, cosmic change, divine providence, existential gradation, heavenly souls, 
imagination, imaginal power, perfect human, prayer, substantial motion.  
 
  Introduction 
 The impact of prayer on the cosmos through the mediation of human agency, for example 
in praying for rainfall, particularly in the face of the law of causality has often attracted 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Professor Todd Lawson at University of Toronto for his insightful 
comments on the first draft of this paper and also the anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful notes and suggestions.  
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the attention of major Islamic philosophers.2 They have not only contributed to 
developing a theoretical framework for explaining the influence of human prayers on the 
cosmos, but also have responded to possible objections to this influence from both 
theological (kalām) and philosophical (falsafa) quarters. Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibrāhīm 
Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640), widely known as Mullā Ṣadrā, has a unique position on prayer 
owing to his synthetic and holistic approach toward core issues about the God-world 
relationship. Mullā Ṣadrā was heir to several intellectual and spiritual traditions of Islam 
in general, particularly the school of Ibn ‘Arabī. Relying on this heritage, he created a 
                                                          
2 Early Western literature on Muslim prayer mainly focused on ritualistic prayer 
(ṣalā) and was developed within a comparative context. Historical studies, particularly 
those with a comparative edge, have often been carried out as an attempt to understand 
Muslim faith and culture due to the fact that prayer reflects both the doctrinal and the 
social, not to say popular, aspects of the religion. In this regard, the pioneering work of 
Constance E. Padwick is important owing to her interpretation of Islamic prayer manuals 
in order to show the continuity between Islam and Christianity. She has been praised for 
her attempts to draw the attention of the scholars away from the apparent arid formality 
of prayers towards their inner meaning and spirituality. See Constance. E. Padwick, 
Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-manuals in Common Use (London: S.P.C.K, 1961). 
Henry Corbin addresses prayer as "a dialogue between two beings" and explains it in 
terms of his thesis of creative imagination. See Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the 
Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabī (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 247. Following 
Corbin, there have been several other works on prayer in Ibn ‘Arabī's thought. Prayer in 
Ibn ‘Arabī has also been the subject of a special issue of The Journal of Muhyiddin Ibn 
‘Arabī Society. See Stephen Hirtenstein, ed., Prayer & Contemplation: Foundations of the 
Spiritual Life according to Ibn ‘Arabī (Oxford, UK: Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society, 1993). 
The mystical aspect of prayer in Islam has also been discussed by Annemarie Schimmel. 
She looks into some major Sufi works including poetry and prose in order to picture the 
meaning and function of prayer in spiritual Islam. See Annemarie Schimmel, "Some 
Aspects of Mystical Prayer in Islam," Die Welt des Islams 2 (1952). Recently Katz has tried 
to capture a wider scope of prayer in Islam by investigating prayer in relation to broader 
issues such as ethical transformation and social communication. See Marion Holmes 
Katz, Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). For a noteworthy work on the nature and function of prayer in the context of 
Qur’anic and Sufi literature, see Atif Khalil, “Is God Obliged to Answer Prayers of Petition 
(Du‘ā)? The Response of Classical Sufis and Qur’anic Exegetes,” The Journal of Medieval 
Religious Cultures 37:92 (2011).  
 
3 
 
complex system in which philosophical, theological, Sufi, and Shi‘i discourses mingle in 
order to present a new narrative of creation that can accommodate both the absolute 
power of the creator and the relative, yet influential, force of human agency. In this 
regard, an investigation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of prayer (du‘ā) can be quite 
illuminating as he relies on his synthetic methodology to prove the influential role of 
human agency in the face of the doctrine of divine providence (qaḍā ̓ al-ilāhī) and the 
logic of causal necessity. 
This paper will focus on several major works by Mullā Ṣadrā in which he discusses 
prayer as a venue of change in the cosmos. After briefly explaining Mullā Ṣadrā’s position 
on prayer in relation to his Sufi-oriented Shi‘ism and against the background of Islamic 
philosophy, attention will be paid to Ibn ‘Arabī because of his deep influence on Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s philosophical system in general, and his view of prayer in particular. As we shall 
see, Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on prayer can be best understood in the light of Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
influence. In his account of the efficacy of prayer, Mullā Ṣadrā also relies heavily on the 
conceptual framework provided by Ibn Sīnā. Nevertheless, he seems to finally break from 
the Peripatetic framework in order to offer a more organic view of prayer in relation to 
the human soul and the cosmos.  
  The Sufi-Shi‘i Background of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Thought 
 Before discussing Mullā Ṣadrā’s definition of prayer and his attempts to explain its nature 
and efficacy, it is important to delineate the relation of this topic to his Sufi-oriented 
Shi‘ism. It is against this syncretic background that one can appreciate the significant place 
of prayer in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought. Apart from the fact that he was a practicing Twelver 
Shi‘i living under the Shi‘i rule of the Safavids (880-1101 /1501-1722), Mullā Ṣadrā was 
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also heir to the Shi‘i tendency toward the esoteric aspects of faith that had gained force 
through Sufi influence.  
It has been correctly argued that Sufism and Shi‘ism were inspired by "the same 
sources" very early in their history and share many common characteristics.3 This fruitful 
alliance that had a gradual formation showing up in a significant commentary on ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib’s Nahj al-balāghah by Maytham Baḥrānī (d. 699/1299)4 and culminating in a 
more systematic way in the works of Sayyid Ḥaydar Ᾱmulī (d. ca. 787/1385), was a 
significant influence on Mullā Ṣadrā. In this respect, a theme which is immediately 
pertinent to the present discussion of prayer is the Sufi-Shi’i doctrine of wilāya,5 most 
                                                          
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Shi‘ism and Sufism: Their Relationship in Essence and 
History," Religious Studies, 6, no. 3 (1970): 242. Also, see Kāmil Muṣṭafā al-Shaybī, al-
Ṣilaḥ bayna al-taṣawwuf wa-al-tashayyu‘ (Cairo: Dār al-Ma ‘ārif, 1969). On the esoteric 
aspects of imamate also see Henry Corbin, En Islam Iranien, aspects spirituels et 
philosophiques, 4 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 3:149-355; Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, 
The Divine Guide in Early Shiʻism : the Sources of Esotericism in Islam (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994); Amir-Moezzi and Christian Jambet, Qu’est-ce que le 
Shi ̒isme? (Paris: Fayard, 2004). 
 
4 Maytham b. ʻAlī Baḥrānī, Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah, eds. Team of scholars, 5 vols. 
(Tehran: Mu‘assisat al-Naṣr, 1959). His book on theology is imbued with philsophical 
themes and terminology. See also Maytham b. ʻAlī Baḥrānī, Qawā‘id al-marām fi ‘ilm al-
kalām, ed. Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (Qum: Kitābkhānah-i ‘umūmī-i Āyat Allāh al-‘Uẓmā 
Mar‘ashī Najafī, 1398 A.H.). Also, see Majīd Rūḥī Dihkurdī, "Mu‘arrifī wa rawish-shināsī-i 
Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah by Maytham Baḥrānī," ‘Ulūm-i ḥadīth 48 (1378 sh. ): 56-77. For 
the influence of Maytham Baḥrānī on Shi‘i imamology, see Hamid Mavani, "Doctrine of 
Imamate in Twelver Shi‘ism: Traditional, Theological, Philosophical and Mystical 
Perspectives” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2005).   
 
5 The term wilāya is also used interchangeably with walāya comprising a complex 
semantic field referring to devotion, love, charisma, and authority which are 
complementary in the Shi‘ite context.  For a detailed discussion of this issue in the Shi‘ite 
context, see Ḥaydar b. ʻAlī Āmulī,  Jāmi‘ al-asrār va manba‘ al-anwār, ed. Henry Corbin and 
Isma‘il Othmān Yaḥyā (Tehran: Anīstītū-i Īrān va Faransah, 1969); Mohammad Ali Amir-
Moezzi, “Notes on Imāmī Walāya,” in The Spirituality of Shi ̒i Islam : Beliefs and Practices, 
ed. Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, 231-277 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Maria Massi 
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prominently in Ibn ‘Arabī’s intricate formulation of it in terms of the doctrine of “the 
perfect human” (al-insān al-kāmil). In his commentary on Nahj al-balāghah, Baḥrānī 
draws on both philsophical and Sufi ideas. For him God has given His Friends (the awlīyā) 
the ability" to receive His mercy (raḥma) and expand his grace (ni‘ma) that He has 
bestowed on them so they can be in His exalted presence with ultimate felicity and 
happiness (sa‘āda), and perform miracles."6 Mullā Ṣadrā is inspired by Ḥaydar Ᾱmulī’s 
identification of the Sufi spiritual Pole (quṭb) with the Imam7 by introducing the “People 
of the House” (ahl al-bayt) who were the genealogical descendants of the Prophet, as the 
best embodiments of wilāya. The concluding paragraph of al-Shawāhid al-rububiyya that 
deals with the continuation of prophethood in the form of wilāya is found to be an 
adaptation of a passage from Ibn ‘Arabī’s The Meccan Revelations (al-Futūḥāt al-
makiyya).  Mullā Ṣadrā introduces “the people of the House” within the quotation from 
Ibn ‘Arabī.8 Furthermore, in line with Ibn ‘Arabī, he keeps the scope of wilāya wide 
enough to go beyond the Twelve Imams: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Dakake, The Charismatic Community: Shi‘ite Identity in Early Islam (Albany: University 
State of New York, 2007).  
 
 
6 Baḥrānī, Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah, 2: 317. 
 
7 Ḥaydar b. ʻAlī Āmulī, Jāmi‘ al-asrār va manba‘ al-anwār, ed. Henry Corbin and 
Isma‘il Othmān Yaḥyā (Tehran: Anīstītū-i Īrān va Faransah, 1969), 223. For the influence of 
Ibn ‘Arabī on Shi‘i theology through Ḥaydar Āmulī, see Robert Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of 
the Akbarian Turn in Shi‘i Theology," in Sufism and Theology, ed. Ayman Shihadeh 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); Khanjar Ḥamīyah, al-ʻIrfān al-Shīʻī: dirāsah 
fī al-ḥayāh al-rūḥīyah wa-al-fikrīyah li-Ḥaydar al-Āmulī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Hādī, 2004); 
Herman Landolt, “Ḥaydar Āmulī et les deux mi‘rāj,” Studia Islamica 1:91 (2000): 91-106.  
 
8 Shigeru Kamada, "Mullā Ṣadrā's Imāma/Wilāya: An Aspect of His Indebtedness to 
Ibn ‘Arabī," Journal of Islamic Philosophy 6 (2010): 71. For an elaborate discussion of this 
6 
 
Thus wilāya is a divine quality (na‘t) and so is a [divine] inheritance. And 
walī will not receive this position from the prophet unless God would take it 
from the prophet through inheritance to confer it on walī so that the 
position would be in its fullest and most perfect form. However, some of the 
awliyā receive this position from the prophet as a heritage such as the 
People of the House (ahl- al-bayt)-peace be upon them- who saw the 
Prophet in person... As for the rest of awliyā, they receive the position 
directly from God because God Himself is the inheritor [of wilāya] and 
bestows it on them.9  
 
While having a pivotal place in Mullā Ṣadrā’s metaphysics in general, wilāya also has 
a special place in his narrative of human agency through prayer. This theme will be 
discussed further in the next section of the paper.  
Prayer and the Creative Power of the Human Soul 
a. Substantial Motion and Evolution 
 
 One of the hallmarks of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is the doctrine of substantial motion (al-
ḥarakat al-jawhariyya), according to which the whole world in both substances and 
accidents is a movement toward perfection.10 Although this doctrine has crucial 
implications in both the physical and spiritual domains, it is only the substantial motion 
of the soul that is directly related to the present discussion of prayer.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
issue, see Maria Massi Dakake, "Hierarchies of Knowing in Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on 
the Uṣūl al-kāfī," Journal of Islamic Philosophy 6 (2010): 5-44. 
 
9 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, ed. Seyyid 
Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Mashhad: Dānishgāh-i Mashhad, 1968), 377-78. The quotation is 
translated in Sayeh Meisami, Mulla Sadra (London, UK: Oneworld, 2013), 112. 
 
10 For substantial motion, see Mahdi Dehbashi,Transubstantial Motion and the 
Natural  World: With a Translation of Volume III, Stage 7, Chapters 18-32 of the Asfar of 
Mulla Sadra. London, ICAS Press, 2010. For a comprehensive explnation of substantial 
motion, see Eiyad S. al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology: Evolution of Being (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2015), chapter 4.   
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According to the thesis of substantial motion, "the individual human soul is an 
evolving entity11 which is material in its early phases, being essentially connected to and 
dependent on the body, but capable of crossing over the bodily borders" and soaring up 
to immaterial heights.12 According to Mullā Ṣadrā, “the soul is bodily in its origination but 
spiritual in its subsistence.”13 At first the soul is mere potentiality, and in its early phases 
is even devoid of perceptual faculties. These phases are connected with and dependent on 
the life of the body from embryonic evolution up through infancy and later phases in the 
life of the individual. The soul goes through the phases of the vegetative, the animal, and 
the rational. The human soul is also characterized by "an encompassing unity (waḥdat al-
jam’iyya) that is a shadow of divine unity (waḥdat al-ilāhiyya) in being by itself 
intellective (‘āqila), imaginative (mutakhayyila), and sentient (ḥassāsa)."14 These 
faculties of the soul correspond at the cosmic level to the hierarchical ranks of being, that 
                                                          
11 Mullā Ṣadrā scholars have frequently explained that this should not be confused 
with Darwinian evolutionism. See Herman Landolt, "Being-toward-resurrection as a 
Theme of Shi‘i Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā," unpublished manuscript, pdf file, 13. (courtesy of 
Todd Lawson) 
 
12 Meisami, Mulla Sadra, 73. 
 
13 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 221. 
 
14 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 228; al-Ḥikmat al-al­muta‘āliya  fi asfār al-
‘aqlīyat al-arba‘a, ed. Muḥammad Reḍa Muẓaffar, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-iḥyā’ al-turāth al-
‘arabī, 1999), 3: 362. Mullā Ṣadrā is indebted to Ibn ‘Arabī for this encompassing unity. In 
Faṣṣu ḥikmatin ilāhiyya fi kalimatin Ᾱdamiyya, Ibn ‘Arabī describes human being as the 
togetherness (jam‘iyyat) of all the truths and the mirror of all divine Names. See Muḥyī al-
Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, trans. Muhammad Ali Muvaḥḥid and Ṣamad Muvaḥḥid 
(Tehran: Nashr-i kārnāmeh, 1385 sh.), 157. On the influence of Ibn ‘Arabī on Mullā Ṣadrā, 
also see Mohammed Rustom, The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā 
Ṣadrā (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012). 
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is, they respectively correspond to the intellective world, the imaginal world, and the 
sensible world.  
 Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with Ibn ‘Arabī on the purpose of creation. They both believe 
that God, as a hidden treasure, makes Himself known through the humankind15 due to the 
comprehensiveness of the human soul that encompasses all the levels of existence, 
meaning, the intellectual, the imaginal, and the material. Furthermore for Mullā Ṣadrā, the 
human soul is a dynamic whole that "gains new forms and moves from one grade to the 
other. That we find ourselves different to what we were in the past or what we shall be in 
the future cannot be all due to accidental changes, but rather because of the change in the 
very substance of our soul."16 
Humankind is supposed to be capable of moving from the level of a material being to 
higher spiritual levels and in doing so complete the circle of creation, that is, the descent 
from the immaterial to the material and the ascent back to the immaterial: 
                                                          
15 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, "Sharḥ-i ḥadīth kuntu kanzan 
makhfiyyan," in Majmū ̒a-yi rasa’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-muta’allihīn, ed. Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī 
(Tehran: Ḥikmat, 1385 sh.), 356. On this subject, see Armin Eschraghi, “'I was a Hidden 
Treasure'. Some Notes on a Commentary Ascribed to Mulla Sadra Shirazi: Sharḥ ḥadith: 
'Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan'” in Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, 
Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber, ed. Anna Akasoy and Wim Raven, 
91-100 (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 
 
16  Meisami, Mulla Sadra, 74-75. In Kitāb al-‘arshiyya, Mullā Ṣadrā supports 
substantial motion by alluding to several Qur ҆anic verses. See Kitāb al-ʻarshīyah, ed. Fātin 
Muḥammad Khalīl al-Labūn, and Fuʼād Dakār (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-tārīkh al-ʻArabī, 
2000), 25. See also Seyyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī's explanatory notes on the meaning of 
“perfect human” in Mullā Muḥammad Ja‘far Lāhījī, Sharḥ risālat al-mashā‘ir-i Mullā Ṣadrā, 
ed. Seyyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Qum: Būstān-i kītāb, 1386 sh.), 391-92. For Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
thesis of motion in substance in comparison to classical philosophy, see Rahman, The 
Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, 94-113. Also on connections between metaphysical 
psychology and epistemology in Mullā Ṣadrā, see Ibrahim Kalin,  Knowledge in Later 
Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
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Human perception of every level of the world consists in unification 
(ittiḥād) with [that level] and it is actualized by its being. Some of these 
beings are sensible, some imaginal, and some intelligible. Thus, being was 
first an intellect, then a soul, then sensation, then matter; but it turned 
around and became a sensation, then a soul, then an intellect and rose up to 
where it had fallen from, and God is the origin and the end. When the 
human being reached this divine station, he was informed of the divine 
providence (al-qaḍā’ al-ilāhī) and the Lord’s predetermination (al-qadar al-
rabbānī).17  
 
The perfection of the human soul is essentially associated with the Sufi doctrine of 
the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil) which is also identified with "the Muḥammadan 
Reality (al-ḥaqiqat al-Muḥammadiyya)."18 According to Mullā Ṣadrā," the perfect human 
is the one over whom no other takes priority in being the goal (ghāya) of the creation."19 
At this level, the soul is capable of creating images which possess imaginal reality like in 
                                                          
17 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 351. Mullā Ṣadrā supports his view on the fall 
of the soul and its return by resorting to both his philosophical past masters, religious, 
and spiritual texts. See Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 8: 355-58. Also on this issue, see 
Maria Massi Dakake, “The Soul as Barzakh: Substantial Motion and Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory 
of Human Becoming,” The Muslim World 94, no. 1 (2004): 107-130. The difference 
between qaḍā’ and qadar is a complicated matter in philosophical theology. According to 
Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā on this distinction, “qaḍā’ is the existence of all 
things in the intelligible world (al-‘ālam al-‘aqlī) together in a general (mujmala) state by 
way of transcendent innovation (ibdā‘). And qadar is the existence [of those things] in the 
external matter after the fulfilment of particular conditions one after the other.” See Ibn 
Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt, ed. Sulayman Dunya (Cairo: Dār al-ma’ārif, 1960), 3-4: 729.  
18 On this doctrine, see William Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989). In 
Sufi discourse, the station of the Pole of the Poles (quṭb al-aqṭāb) is represented by the 
very inner reality of Prophet Muḥammad. See Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, 
Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfiyya, ed. Muḥammad Kamāl Ibrāhim Ja‘far (Qum: Maṭba‘at al-Amīr, 1370 
sh.) 145. Mullā Ṣadrā has a long passage about the perfect human and his identification 
with the Imam in his Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfī, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī, 4 vols. (Tehran: 
Pizhūhishgāh-i ʻulūm-i insānī va muṭālaʻāt-i farhangī, 2004/1383sh), 2: 487-88. For the 
translation of the passage, see Herman Landolt, "Being-toward-resurrection as a Theme of 
Shi‘i Philosophy," 26.  
 
19 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, Maẓāhir al-ilāhīyyah fī asrār al-‘ulūm 
al-kamāliya, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Būstān-i kitāb, 1387 sh.), 116. 
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the case of Moses’ staff appearing as a serpent. Changes in the cosmic picture that come to 
exist through the power of the soul in prayer are in certain cases dependent on the 
intermediary (barzakhī) level of being, that is, the imaginal level.  
b. The Power of Imagination 
The attribution of marvels and miracles to the Friends of God (awlīyā) is a common 
theme of Sufi literature. For example, there are many accounts about the power of awlīyā 
over the world.20 Part of Ibn ‘Arabī’s contribution to systematizing Sufi beliefs is the 
explanation for the perfect soul’s causing changes in the world. In al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, 
Ibn ‘Arabī regards imagination as "the vastest of Presences (ḥaḍarāt)" as it combines both 
the unseen and the seen worlds. He attributes this level of being to the human soul: 
And there is no doubt that you are more entitled (aḥaqq) to the Presence of 
Imagination than are meanings and spiritual beings, for within you is the 
imaginal faculty (al-quwwat al-mutakhayyila) which is one of the faculties 
that God gave you when He brought you into existence. So you are more 
entitled to possess (mulk) and control (taṣarruf)...The common people (al-
’āmma) do not know imagination or enter into it except when they dream 
and their sensory faculties (al-quwā al-ḥassāsa) return into it. The elite (al-
khawāṣṣ) see it in wakefulness through the power of realizing it.21 
 
This quotation refers to a unique creative function that works through the venue of 
autonomous of imagination. According to Henry Corbin, this is "Active Imagination" that 
                                                          
20 For examples of these accounts and sources on this topic, see John Renard, 
Friends of God : Islamic Images of Piety, Commitment, and Servanthood (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 106-12. 
 
21 Ibn ‘Arabī, The Meccan Rrevelations, ed. Michel Chodkiewicz, trans. William 
Chittick,  Charles-André Gilis, and Michel Chodkiewicz, annot.  James Morris, 2 vols. (New 
York: Pir Press, 2004), 2:172-173. The translation of this passage is by William Chittick. 
Also, see Ibn ‘Arabī, Le livre des chatons des sagesses, trans. and ed. Charles-André Gilis 
(Beirut: Al-Burāq, 1997), 243-54; Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, 122. 
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is "capable of creating objects, of producing changes in the outside world."22 The imaginal 
world fits well into Mullā Ṣadrā’s gradational (tashkīkī) view of being.23  In this light, the 
imaginative forms as mental beings and their extra-mental counterparts exist for real like 
two parallel worlds whose difference lies in the intensity of their being. The mental 
sphere resembles the creation of God in that the soul is capable of creating mental beings 
as God creates the world of substantial forms both material and immaterial.24  
Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is capable of creating mental beings in the 
absence of matter. His evidence for this is what happens in dreams, and the miraculous 
creation of images by the prophets. However, the question is whether every soul at any 
phase of its evolution has the actual ability to create. The answer is negative. Although the 
soul, in its proximity to the divine realm, is given the power to create, in the beginning 
                                                          
22 Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabī (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), 223. The imaginal world is also mentioned in Ibn 
‘Arabī, "Inshā’ al-dawā’ir" in Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-‘Arabī: nach Handschriften in 
Upsala und Berlin, ed. Henrik Samuel Nyberg (Leiden: Brill, 1919).  
23 According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the concept of being applies to its instances univocally 
because of the unity of its reality, and conceptual differences are only due to essences. On 
the other hand, essences have no reality of their own. Based on these two premises, one 
could come into the counterintuitive conclusion that diversity is not real. Gradation (or 
modulation) of being (tashkīk al-wujūd) is Mullā Ṣadrā's way of avoiding this 
counterintuitive implication and to create a system in which the apparently monistic 
worldview of Sufism is reconciled with the realistic pluralism of classical philosophy and 
our common sense. According to this doctrine, being, as one simple reality, comes in 
grades as the light of Sun and candlelight are the same reality of different grades. See 
Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-al­muta‘āliya, 9:186. For a technical explanation of the doctrine and 
its implications in other areas of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, see Sajjad H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā 
and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being (New York: Routledge, 2009); Cécile Bonmariage, 
Le réel et les réalités: Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī et la structure de la réalité (Paris: J. Vrin, 2007). 
 
24 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 31-2. 
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this is only a potentiality. Apart from some unique cases of spiritually evolved souls, the 
souls of common humans are dependent on matter as long as they live in this world.   
According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the stages of knowledge formation, that is, sense 
perception, imagination, and intellection are parallel with “the three worlds,”25 that is, the 
intellective, the imaginal and the sensible. Thus, what happens in the soul matches the 
hierarchical ontology of the three worlds which stand in a vertical (ṭūlī) relationship, that 
is, the one on top is superior to the one below it in the grade of existence.  
Through the power of imagination, all human souls are capable of creating bodies 
for themselves in afterlife.26 However, in this world only the perfect souls of prophets, 
Imams, and awlīyā are invested with the power to objectify imaginative forms. These are 
                                                          
           25 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-al­muta‘āliya, 3:362. 
 
26 Imaginal bodies are immaterial; yet they are possessed of the formal dimensions 
of the physical body which makes them capable of all kinds of feelings compared to our 
experiences in dreams. As long as we are bound up with matter, our imaginations are 
merely subjective. But, if the soul can free itself from physical preoccupations and reach a 
higher level of spirituality, it can give objective dimensions to imaginations. At this level, 
imaginative forms are not imprinted in the brain so they are categorzied as “detached 
imagination” (al-khayāl al-munfaṣil). This is the point of departure between Mullā Ṣadrā 
and Ibn Sīnā who rejects the possibility of ontological independence of imaginal forms 
from the brain. Mullā Ṣadrā follows Suhrawardī and Ibn ‘Arabī in this regard and posits an 
intermediary world between the intellectual and the material world, which is the locus of 
detached imaginal forms. According to Ibn ‘Arabī “the difference between attached and 
detached imagination is that the attached disappears with the disappearance of the 
imaginer, while the dettached is an essential presence (ḥaḍara dhātiyya).” See Ibn ‘Arabī, 
al-Futūḥāt al-makiyya, Beirut, Dār Ṣadir, n.d, 2:312, cited in al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and 
Eschatology, 97. He believes that the prophets and awlīyā have access to the imaginal 
world and as a result are capable of objective imagination, as in the case of miracles; Yet 
all will have this power in the life to come. So in his eschatology, in order to make this 
notion more comprehensible, Mullā Ṣadrā compares the otherworldly bodies to 
“reflections in the mirror.” For the mirror analogy, see Shīrāzī, Maẓāhir al-ilāhiyyah, 126. 
On the imaginal body, see Christian Jambet, L’actre d’être: La philosophie de la révélation 
chez Mollâ Sadrâ (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 296-327; Mohammed Rustom, “Psychology, 
Eschatology, and Imagination In Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī’s Commentary on the Ḥadīth of 
Awakening,” Islam and Science 5:1 (2007).   
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"the possessors of marvels (aṣḥāb al-karāmāt)"27 as they reach the highest degree 
through substantial motion. This theme is expressed with an emphatically spiritual tone 
in Wāridāt al-qalbiyya with regard to prophetic miracles. Mullā Ṣadrā says: 
The quintessence of the soul is of the same kind and origin of the 
spiritual world (malakūt) whose inhabitants are by nature influential on 
beings possessed of directions and sides (jihāt and samūt) [i.e. material 
substances]. This is owing to the fact that the matter and natural 
dispositions are under the control of the world of transcendent 
innovation (al-‘ālam al-ibdā‘), be it out of compulsion or submission. 
Thus, the soul that is a flame of that fire acts in the same fashion in 
accordance with her capacity. Just like the flame that does the job of the 
fire including burning and causing other effects in accordance with its 
capacity. And, the first effect that appears from the essence of the soul is 
the body and the base of its forces and organs, with every individual soul 
being conscious of this mode of hers. If this seems right at first glance, so 
the realization of a great soul (nafsu kabīra) should be sufficient for 
administrating her territory upon a wider and longer scope in a way that 
the command of her control and administration over the subdued 
material bodies would encompass all and reach the whole world of 
origination and corruption (al-‘ālam al-kawn wa al-fasād). It was in this 
way that with the permission of God the fire around Abraham turned into 
air as He said "O fire, be cool and safe for Abraham [(Q 21:69)]."28 
 
c. Influencing the Material world 
The power of the imagination is a good ground for the possibility of miracles in the 
sense of bringing into life a previously non-existent form of being, or imaginal bodies in 
afterlife; yet it is not enough for explaining the changes that some miracles and prayers 
cause in the sensible reality, such as causing rainfall or splitting the Red Sea. For this 
reason, Mullā Ṣadrā also identifies a particular power of the soul that he calls "practical 
                                                          
27 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 264. 
 
28 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya wa ma‘rifat al-
rubūbiyya, ed. Ahmad Shafī‘īhā (Tehran: Anjuman-i falsafa-yi Īrān, 1980), 113-14. 
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(‘amalī)" and relates it to "the sensory faculties (quwā al-taḥrīkiyya)." Through this 
power,  
[The soul] influences the matter of the world by abstracting the form (ṣūra) 
and stripping it of matter, and by finding it and dressing it in any way. This 
is how [the soul] can cause the weather to become fine, and the rain to fall 
and the storms to break out, and demolish a community that turned 
immoral and disobeyed the command of their Lord and His messengers, and 
cause sick people to be cured, and the thirsty to be satiated, and the beasts 
to subdue.29  
This passage and similar ones in Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings on the agency of the human soul 
in prayer are all followed by his insistence on the similarity between the heavenly and the 
human souls in influencing the material world: 
And this is possible since it has been proved in theology that the matter 
submits to the souls and is influenced by them, and that the natural forms 
(al-ṣuwar al-kawniyya) succeed one another in the matter under the 
influence of the heavenly souls. And, the human souls are of the same 
substance as the heavenly souls, strongly resembling them, because their 
relation to them is like that of children to their parents. Thus, the human 
soul affects matter in this world although it is often through the effusion of 
its effect over a certain domain, that is, her body.30  
 
In a similar passage from al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, Mullā Ṣadrā limits the strong 
resemblance between the human souls and heavenly souls to those human souls that 
have "gained strength,"31 which in his philosophy refers to substantial motion by which 
the soul is promoted to a higher degree of being. Thus, souls with a high degree of 
existential intensity are invested with the power both to create and to influence matter. 
According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the perfect human or "perfect walī" is able to "cross over all 
                                                          
29 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī,  al-Mabdaʼ wa’l-maʻād, ed. Sayyid Jalāl 
al-Dīn Āshtīyānī (Tehran: Anjuman-i shāhanshāhī-i falsafah-i Īrān, 1976/1354), 482.  
 
30 Shīrāzī, al-Mabdaʼ wa’l-maʻād, 482.  
 
31 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 343. 
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times and spaces and bring all things under control in the same way that the souls control 
bodies."32 This is the domain where prayer is used as a link between the human and the 
divine in order to cause certain effects in the world:  
And at times the soul may reach such a degree of sagacity and purification 
from bodily concerns and sensual pleasures that there shall be bestowed on 
her from the Supreme Origin (al-mabda’ al-a‘lā) such a power and dignity 
by which the soul becomes influential on the world of natural elements (al-
‘ālam al-‘anāṣir). As a result, the soul would heal the sick, sicken the evil, 
transform one element into another, and move those objects that she is not 
typically capable of moving like in unhinging the door of Khaybar [by ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib]. This is due to the fact that bodies are subject to influences by the 
souls.33  
 
However, any new appearance (badā’)34 or change along these lines would seem not 
only to defy the necessity of universal causal laws, but also to rival the doctrine of divine 
providence. Like earlier Muslim philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā considers possible objections 
and his solution is similar to those of his philosophical predecessors. However, the 
following sections will show that although Mullā Ṣadrā follows his philosophical past 
masters by considering the efficacy of prayer as both one of the links in the chain of 
causation and part of the divine providential plan, he shapes his solution within a different 
philosophical framework that is deeply influenced by Ibn ‘Arabī.  
                                                          
32 Shīrāzī, al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya, 120. 
 
33 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 208. 
 
34 The Shi‘i doctrine of badā refers to a new consideration by God and the possibility 
of change in the divine plan. It is in opposition to Sunni theology and even among Shi‘ite 
theologians, there are different ways to approach it. See Mahmoud Ayoub, "Divine 
Preordination and Human Hope: a Study of the Concept of Badā ҆ in Īmāmī Shī‘ī 
Tradition," Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 106, no. 4 (1986): 623-632; 
Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (Beirut: Dar el-Mashriq 
éditeurs, 1978), 329-339.  Also, see Colin Turner, "Aspects of Devotional Life in Twelver 
Shi‘ism," in Shi‘ism, ed. Paul Lutf and Colin Turner, vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2008).  
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   Prayer within the Domain of Divine Providence  
 Mullā Ṣadrā was well aware of the theological context and controversial nature of prayer 
with respect to divine providence. That is the reason why most of his passages on prayer 
appear within his writings on divine providence and predetermination, with his main 
focus being on the influence of prayer on the sensible world. Following Ibn Sīnā, he 
attests to the efficacy of prayer and regards the agent of prayer and his invocation as "one 
of the causes (asbāb wa  ̒ilal) of the whole cosmos (kawn)."35 Ibn Sīnā offers a rational 
explanation for the fulfilment of prayers within a causal order that is originated in the eternal 
knowledge of God.36 According to him, the human soul is capable of exerting influence on the 
world in the form of miracles and receiving answers to prayers. However, in the case of 
prayers, "responses" (istijābat) are bestowed only if God finds it in agreement with the cosmic 
order.37 Thus, prayers should not be considered as breaches in the causal order of the universe. 
In effect, prayers are links within the causal chain in the sense that like all the other secondary 
causes in the universe they play an intermediary role between the final effects and the First 
Cause. Ibn Sīnā explains the necessary role of prayers by using the analogy of patient and 
                                                          
35 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al­muta‘āliya, 6:402. 
 
36 For Ibn Sīnā's views on the origin of creation in the divine knowledge, see Ibn 
Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing : a Parallel English-Arabic Text (al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-
Shifā), trans. and ed. Michael Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 
2005), 283-291. 
 
 37 Ibn Sīnā, al-Taʻlīqāt, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Badawῑ (Cairo: al-Hayʼah al-miṣrīyah 
al-ʻāmmah lil-kitāb, 1973), 47. 
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medication. He says that "God is the one who makes prayer the cause for the existence of a 
thing, just like He makes certain medicine the cause for the cure of a patient."38 
In this regard, Mullā Ṣadrā also repeats a passage from Mīr Dāmād, without 
mentioning the author, where the latter formulates the problem of prayer as a dilemma: 
If the fulfilment of prayers is not determined by God, what is the point in praying to Him, 
and if it is, why should we take the trouble of praying in the first place?39 Like his teacher, 
Mullā Ṣadrā turns to Ibn Sīnā for the solution and quotes several passages from the latter 
on the harmony between fulfillment of prayers and the divine order. Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
position on divine providence and predetermination should be understood not only as a 
continuation of Ibn Sīnā’s world-order in which all wills and agencies are connected in a 
hierarchy of powers and potentialities, but also as more meaningful within his own 
gradational ontology. In a short treatise on the theme of human action versus divine 
providence, after reviewing and evaluating major theological positions, including 
Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī- and the rational position of Ibn Sīnā which he praises as "the most 
correct" among all - he goes on to his most favoured position that he attributes to "those 
firmly grounded in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fi’l- ̒ilm)."40 His account of this position is 
completely based on his own gradational ontology: 
                                                          
 38 Ibn Sīnā, al-Taʻlīqāt, 47. 
 
39 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-al­muta‘āliya, 6:403; Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfī, 4:200-201. In these 
works, Mullā Ṣadrā is quoting from Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād, Kitāb al-qabasāt, ed. 
Mehdi Mohaghegh and Charles Adams (Tehran: The Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill 
University, 1977), 450. 
 
40 “He it is Who has sent down to thee the Book: In it are verses basic or 
fundamental (of established meaning); they are the foundation of the Book: others are 
allegorical. But those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part thereof that is 
allegorical, seeking discord, and searching for its hidden meanings, but no one knows its 
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And the other group who are the most firmly grounded in knowledge 
believe that all beings regardless of their differences in the order and 
nobility of existence, and their diversity of essences and actions, and their 
variety of attributes and effects, are gathered by the one all-encompassing 
Divine Reality that includes all their realities and degrees...Therefore, just 
like there is no mode [of glory] (sha’n) that is not His41, there is no action 
that does not belong to Him...[Yet,] it is correct to attribute the action and its 
actualization to the servant (‘abd) as  existence and  individuation 
(tashakhkhuṣ) are attributed to him regarding their relation to the Exalted 
One, just like the existence of Zayd is in itself a fact which is actualized in 
reality while it is one of the modes (sha’n) of the First Reality (al-Ḥaqq al-
awwal).42  
 
Mullā Ṣadrā also discusses the function and efficacy of prayer in his Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ 
wa’l-qadar.43 After explaining the meaning of divine providence and predetermination, he 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
hidden meanings except Allah. And those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say: 
"We believe in the Book; the whole of it is from our Lord:" and none will grasp the 
Message except men of understanding.” (Q 3:7) Translation by Abdulla Yusuf Ali, The 
Holy Qur ̓an (New York: Islamic Propogation Centre International, 1946)retreived from 
http://www.searchtruth.com/chapter_display.php?chapter=3&translator=2&mac=  
 
41 “Of Him seeks (its need) every creature in the heavens and on earth: every day in 
(new) State of Glory.” Translated by Muhammad Habib Shakir retrieved from 
http://www.searchtruth.com/chapter_display.php?chapter=55&translator=3&mac
=  
 
42 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī, Khalq al-aʻmāl, ed. Sayyid Muḥsin 
Yāsīn (Baghdād: Maṭbaʻat al-ḥawādith, 1978), 30. In his summary of philosophical issues 
based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, Fayḍ Kāshānī rephrases the above words by saying 
that although God has given us freedom to choose whether or not to do a particular thing, 
our wills all go back to His providence. See Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, Uṣūl al-ma‘ārif, 
ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Qum: Daftar-i tablīghāt-i islāmī, 2006/1375 sh.), 139. 
For more on this issue see Jamīlah Muḥyī al-Dīn Bishtī, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī wa-
mawqifuhu al-naqdī min al-madhāhib al-kalāmiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-‘ulūm al-‘Arabīyah lit-
ṭibāʻa wa’l-nashr, 2008), 238-46.   
 
43 For Mullā Ṣadrā's views on providence, human action and will, see David Arnold 
Ede, “Mullā Ṣadrā and the Problem of Freedom and Determinism: A Critical Study of the 
Risālah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar,” (PhD diss., McGill University, 1978). For my references to 
Mullā Ṣadrā's Risālah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar, I am using the manuscript that has been 
published as an appendix to the above dissertation. The only printed version of this 
treatise can be found under the title “al-Qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar fi af‘āl al-bashar” in Seyyed Jalāl 
al-Dīn Āshtīyānī, ed. Rasā’il (Qom: Maktabat al-muṣtafawī, 1302 A.H).  
19 
 
proceeds to remove the ambiguity over the function of prayer in relation to providence. 
He criticizes an "erroneous" view according to which acts of worship and prayers are 
useless in a predetermined world order, and using Ibn Sīnā’s frequently quoted analogy 
of patient and medicine, he immediately presents the gist of his description of prayer as 
"one among the causes of the thing prayed for."44 Unlike in his writings mentioned before, 
here Mullā Ṣadrā does not delimit his methodology to a rational explanation based on the 
causal chain of creation; instead he explains the function of prayer within a context of 
intimacy between the Lord and His Servant: 
The prayer and the answer to it are both from the command (amr) of God, 
with the servant’s tongue being the interpreter (tarjumān), and whoever 
takes an action upon someone’s order his hand is the hand of the command 
just like in the case of a king who orders some servant to punish the prince. 
If the hand [of the servant] were not that of the king, he would not be able to 
touch the king’s son.45 
 
This view of prayer as "a translation" of God’s words in this treatise is a deviation 
from Ibn Sīnā’s narrative of prayer that was the dominant one among philosophers of the 
time such as Mīr Dāmād. This new account resembles Ibn ‘Arabī’s identification of human 
prayer with the prayer of God and Corbin’s interpretation of it in terms of "a dialogical 
situation."46 The similarity is reinforced by Mullā Ṣadrā’s many allusions in the following 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
44 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, "Risālah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," in 
Rasā’il (Tehran: Lithographed edition, 1302 sh.), 206. Ibn Sīnā explains the necessary role 
of prayers by using the analogy of patient and medication. He says that "God is the one 
who makes prayer the cause for the existence of a thing, just like He makes certain 
medicine the cause for the cure of a patient." See Ibn Sīnā, al-Taʻlīqāt, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān 
Badawī (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-miṣriyyah al-ʻāmma li’l-kitāb, 1973), 47. 
 
45 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 207. 
  
46 Corbin, Creative Imagination, 247. 
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passages to Sufi figures such as Dhu’l-nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 246/859) and Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (d. 
334/946) who are said to have regarded prayer as a path to spiritual advancement.47 In 
this section of the treatise, Mullā Ṣadrā emphasizes the effect of prayer on the human 
soul. Rather than being a mere request or petition, prayer is a worthy act of worship that 
leads to a higher degree of spirituality through accepting our dependence and need: 
And from the benefits of prayer are the proclamation of humbleness (dhill) 
and brokenness (inkisār), confession to weakness and poverty, the 
correction of our relation of servanthood (‘ubūdiyya) and our immersion in 
the excess of contingent deficiency (nuqṣān al-imkānī) and the fall from the 
zenith of highness and sufficiency to the bottom of degradation and 
needfullness and poverty and fearfulness.48 
 
Along the same lines, Mullā Ṣadrā explains that prayer will divert the attention of 
the soul from the body that "veils her from the Sacred World (al-’ālam al-quds)" toward 
God who would then bestow on her all that befits her.49 Thus, speaking from a nobler 
vantage point, the function of prayer is over and above making a request, and its 
transforming effect on our soul is the reason why God urges us to pray as in "Call unto me 
and I will answer to you" (Q 40:60). In this sense, prayer is not a deviation from the 
providence; the act of praying is rather part of the divine wisdom to "keep the servant 
suspended between fear and hope."50 At the cosmic level, prayer is a continuation of the 
primordial function of human being as the medium of divine revelation in the world.  
The Role of the Heavenly Souls of the Spheres (aflāk) in Human Prayers 
                                                          
47 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 207-8. 
 
48 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 208. 
 
49 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 208. 
 
50 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 209. 
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In Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar and, more elaborately, in al-Asfār Mullā Ṣadrā modifies 
Ibn Sīnā’s account of the influence of the heavenly souls. Under the section that is called "on 
prayer as coming itself from divine providence," Mullā Ṣadrā devotes several passages to 
prayers that are answered. For him, prayers can "knock on the door of the spiritual world 
(malakūt)51 and impress the ears of the inhabitants therein." 52 Before relating Ibn Sīnā’s 
argument, Mullā Ṣadrā offers in a nutshell his view on the relation of heavenly souls to the 
world below because there is a technical difference between his position on this issue and 
that of Ibn Sīnā. While Ibn Sīnā explains the relation between the heavenly souls and the 
world below as a one-way relation in which the former have only an active role, Mullā 
Ṣadrā believes in a mutual relationship in which the heavenly souls are impressed by the 
prayers, hence, the image of knocking their doors and being heard by them. He agrees with 
Ibn Sīnā that a nobler being cannot be directly affected by the lower ones, but diverges 
from him on the impressionability of the heavenly souls by adding two conditions. First, for 
Mullā Ṣadrā, affecting the higher being is not impossible if it is not overall and in every 
respect. Second, noble human souls have a more effective agency in comparison to ordinary 
people. He attributes to the heavenly soul a state between substances that are purely active 
(fa‘āl) or merely passive (munfa‘il).53 In Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy, the former state is that of 
the intellects (al-‘uqūl), and the latter is attributed to the primary matter (hayūlā) and the 
                                                          
51 For the characteristics of this intermediary realm of being in the context of Islamic 
philosophy, especially the influence of Ibn ‘Arabī and the scriptural connections of the 
doctrine, see Corbin, En Islam iranien: Aspects spirituels et philosophiques, 4 vols. (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1971), 4:106-22. 
 
52 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘ālīya, 6:402. 
 
53 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘ālīya, 6:402-3. 
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bodily form (al-ṣūrat al-jismiyya). The heavenly (or the Spheres’) souls (al-nufūs al-
falakiyya) can only be affected by the intellects and through them by the Necessary Being 
(al-wājib al-wujūd).54 Yet, Mullā Ṣadrā considers the human soul as capable of affecting the 
higher rank of the heavenly souls under the two conditions mentioned above. He does not 
argue sufficiently for his position in this context, but we can try to understand him based 
on his overall ontology: While in Ibn Sīnā’s ontology substances are separate, for Mullā 
Ṣadrā "there is no complete separation in the longitudinal hierarchy of being."55 
Accordingly, the heavenly souls possess an ontological status between purely active 
intellectual beings and passive material beings. Furthermore, Mullā Ṣadrā’s psychology is 
based on a spiritual metaphysics of descent and ascent. The human soul, though 
temporarily trapped in the world below, is actually from above and through substantial 
motion can rise above the present level of bodily attachment and enter into a state of 
unification (ittiḥād) with higher beings. Considering the ontological continuity of beings 
along the hierarchical/gradational ladder of existence and the possibility of ascent for the 
human soul, there is room in Mullā Ṣadrā’s system for the impression of the human soul on 
the heavenly souls through prayers. 
With this in mind, we can now explain the role of the Spheres with regard to those 
prayers that bring about changes in the physical world. In order to understand their role, 
one need to explain both the form of knowledge that is possible in their case, as well as 
                                                          
54 On Ibn Sīnā's definition of substance and his general categorization of it, see Ibn 
Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing : a Parallel English-Arabic Text (al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-
Shifā), trans. and ed. Michael Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 
2005), 45-57.   
55 Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics, 117.  
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their active place in the chain of wills that precede the occurrence of events in the natural 
world. Mullā Ṣadrā explains heavenly knowledge and the mechanism of heavenly 
influence on the world by quoting Ibn Sīnā.56 According to Ibn Sīnā, the heavenly souls 
are said to have knowledge of particular meanings (ma‘ānī al-juz’iyya) through a kind of 
perception which is not purely intellective. What is realized in them is an imaginative 
perception of particular states and events in the world. This kind of perception shares 
with the intellects the active/causal function but differs from them in that the intellects 
only have "knowledge of particulars in a universal way,"57 to the exclusion of any 
imaginative state and imaginative forms.  
The heavenly souls are also said to exert influence on the world below through 
imagination. First, Mullā Ṣadrā draws on Ibn Sīnā’s arguments in favour of the active role 
of Spheres, that is, their heavenly souls. Accordingly, the occurrence of wills (irādāt) 
behind actions and events is preceded by their non-existence, that is, they are temporally 
originated (al-ḥādith al-zamānī), so they should have causes other than either wills or the 
nature of the subject of the will (al-ṭabī‘at al-murīd). What existentiates a particular will 
cannot be another will because this would lead to an infinite regress of wills, which is 
logically impossible. On the other hand, the cause cannot be a natural disposition (ṭabī‘a) 
in the willing agent because particular natures are existentiated by heavenly or earthly 
causes. If the cause of that particular natural disposition is a complex of heavenly and 
earthly causes, the philosophers’ point about the role of the Spheres is proved. But, if the 
cause is only an earthly one, it would be temporally originated and last for a limited time, 
                                                          
56 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:406-10. 
 
57 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:407. 
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which means that the will at issue would be existent as long as the earthly nature is there. 
To sum up, Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with Ibn Sīnā that "it is owing to the gathering, 
interference and continuation of these [various] causes that the system [of the world] 
runs under the influence of the heavenly motion."58  
Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, for Ibn Sīnā the sufficient cause (al-’illat al-tāmma) 
of all the changes in the world consists in the hierarchical impact of causes beginning 
with the Necessary Being (al-wājib al-wujūd) down to the intellects, the heavenly souls, 
human souls, and natural dispositions. All changes in the world, as well as the order of 
natural events depend on the intermediary role of the heavenly soul owing to the 
existence of imaginative conceptions of events prior to their realization in the material 
world: 
[The heavenly souls] know in the majority of particulars that mode which 
is the best and the fittest and the closest to the absolute good between two 
possible states; and we proved that the [imaginative] conceptions 
(taṣawwurāt) possessed by these causes are the origins of the existence of 
these forms here when they are possible, and there has not been any 
heavenly causes stronger than these [imaginative] conceptions. When 
such is the case, it would be necessary for the possible state to become 
existent not by an earthly cause or a natural cause in the heavens [alone] 
but as a certain kind of impact by these things on the heavenly affairs. Yet, 
this is not a real impact but the impact of the heavenly principles 
(mabādī’) of the existence of this thing. So, by grasping those [universal] 
principles, this thing is thought, and when this thing is thought, the state 
which is more suitable for it will also be thought, and when it is thought, 
there would be no obstacle but either the nonexistence of an earthly 
natural cause or the existence of an[other] earthly natural cause. In the 
case of the nonexistence of the earthly natural cause, for example, causing 
heat where there is no earthly natural potential for heat, the heat would be 
produced by the heavenly imagination of the benefit in it, just like heat can 
be produced in people’s bodies as a result of imagining it, which you 
learned before. As an example for the second possibility, that is, not only 
the nonexistence of the cause for heating but also the existence of a cooling 
                                                          
58 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:407. 
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nature, the heavenly imagination of the benefit in the opposite of what is 
necessitated by the cooling agent would overpower the latter.59   
 
While confirming the general framework of Ibn Sīnā’s position on the causal relation 
between the heavenly and the earthly, and praising his attempts to show that the divine 
realm of providence is not affected by the things below, Mullā Ṣadrā criticizes him on two 
grounds. He regards the changes in the natural world in response to prayers as evidence, 
contrary to Ibn Sīnā’s account, that the heavenly souls of the spiritual realm (malakūt) 
are impressed by the earthly domain.60 This point will be explained below. Second, he 
criticises Ibn Sīnā for denying the existence of Platonic Ideas which he praises as the key 
to "the mystery of interaction" between different domains of existence.61 The existence of 
Platonic Ideas is one of the major gaps between the philosophical systems of Ibn Sīnā and 
Mullā Ṣadrā.62 Far from trying to argue for or against this doctrine, which is beyond the 
                                                          
59 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:408. 
 
60 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:411. 
 
61 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:412. 
 
62 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 171-5. Platonic Ideas in Mullā Ṣadrā are similar 
to Ibn ‘Arabī’s "immutable entities (al-‘ayān al-thābita)" as "the non-existent objects of 
God’s Knowledge." See William Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 11. The 
concept "immutable entity," though originated in Platonic Ideas, is comparable to "forms 
of contingency" (al-ṣuwar al-mumkināt) in Peripatetic philosophy where Platonic Ideas 
are denied independent existence, and are simply transferred to the world below as forms 
of objects inherent in them. Ibn Sīnā’s “universal nature” (al-kullī al-ṭabī‘ī) or 
“unconditioned quiddity,” (māhiyya bi lā sharṭ) which has mental existence in the mind 
and universal ‘reality’ inherent in particular objects and shared by all individuals under 
the same species, rivaled Platonic Ideas. For Ibn Sīnā’s rejection of Platonic Ideas, see Ibn 
Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing, 243-57. The most technical critical commentary on 
Platonic Ideas in Mullā Ṣadrā appears in ‘Abd al-Rasūl  ̒Ubūdiyyat, Niẓām-i ḥikmat-i Ṣadrā ҆ 
ī, 2 vols. (Qom: Muʼassasah-i āmūzishī wa pizhūhishī-i Imām Khumeini, 1385 sh.), 2:170-
83. See also Ibrahim Kalin, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Realist Ontology of the Intelligibles and the 
Theory of Knowledge,” Muslim World 94 (2004): 90-92. On the vertical hierarchy of 
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scope of the present paper, I would like to emphasize its significance for Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
view of the efficacy of prayer since it implies real correspondence between things of 
different existential domains along the vertical hierarchy of being, with the imaginative 
forms bridging between the intellective and the material. As mentioned before, in Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s world, there are no existential gaps, but merely different grades of beings. 
It is based on the gradation of being that Mullā Ṣadrā argues for the unification of 
intellect with the intelligible (ittiḥād al-’āqil wa’l-ma’qūl), imagination with the imaginal 
(al-mutakhayyil wa ‘l-mutakhayyal), and sentient with the sensible (al-ḥāss wa’l-
maḥsūs). On the whole, the unification doctrine is built on several premises such as the 
primacy of being as the only authentic reality, the gradation of being in different degrees 
of intensity, the possibility of substantial motion of the soul, and the identification of 
knowledge as a form of being. According to the unification doctrine, the subject of 
knowledge and its object are two levels of the same reality. Knowledge is the 
actualization of the potential knower by the immediate object of knowledge, be it 
sensible, imaginative or intelligible forms that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy are forms of 
being.63  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
worlds and the rank of the human soul, also see Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, "Hidāyat al-ṭālibīn fi 
ma‘rifat al-anbīyā’ w’al-a’immat al-ma‘ṣūmīn" in Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i fīlsūf-i kabīr Hāj 
Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, trans. and ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ashtīyānī (Mashhad: Mashhad 
University Press, 1970). Following Mullā Ṣadrā on Platonic Ideas, Sabzivārī also explains 
the latter’s position in comparison to his predecessors in a very clear way. See Ghulām 
Hossein Reḍānijād, Ḥakīm Sabzivārī (Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Sanā’ī, 1371 sh.), 736-49. For 
a study of Ibn Sīnā’s critique of Platonic Ideas, see Michael Marmura “Avicenna’s Critique 
of the Platonists in Book VII, chapter 2 of the Metaphysics of his Healing,” in Arabic 
Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard 
M. Frank J.E. Montgomery, ed. Michael E. Marmura (Louvain: Peeters, 2006), 355–69. 
  
63 For an analysis of the unification doctrine in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosphy, see Kalin, 
Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy, 159-165; Meisami, Mulla Sadra, chapter 3. 
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With this in mind, the unification of imagination with the imaginal should be 
considered as Mullā Ṣadrā’s key to accepting the confluence of human souls and heavenly 
souls through prayer. In Risāla fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar, he explains the influence of the 
perfect human souls on the heavenly souls along the lines of al-Asfār by using the same 
arguments and terminology. He also elaborates on the influence of the heavenly souls on 
the human souls through imaginal unification. The heavenly souls are said to inspire the 
purified human souls by guiding their prayers toward a direction beneficial to the world. 
Thus "the relation of humility (taḍarru‘) to summoning (istid‘ā’) demands and the 
fulfilment of requests is similar to the relation between thinking and the summoning of 
expressions and speech. And all is emanation from above"64 that happens upon the 
unification of the imagination of the praying soul and the imaginative conceptions of the 
heavenly souls who play intermediary between the human and the divine. Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
last passage on the efficacy of prayer is a useful summary of his position on its 
compatibility with the providence and the role of the Spheres: 
Thus, it is learned from what has been said that all the events that occur in 
our world emit from the Spheres’ [imaginative] conceptions (al-taṣawwurāt 
al-falakiyya), the angelic intellections (al-ta‘aqqulāt al-malakiyya) and the 
knowledge(s) of the Exalted One (al-‘ulūm al-subḥāniyya). Therefore, the 
truly influential agent on the existence of things is nothing but the Origins’ 
(mabādī’) knowledge of what is beneficial for the existent world. So, one 
should not be surprised by the providential knowledge (‘ināyat) of the 
Exalted One and His Grace concerning the betterment of the state of the 
creation. Learn from this the truth of miraculous affairs that descend from 
the First Reality (al-Ḥaqq al-awwal) in a special way which is denied by 
those philosophers who are ignorant of the invisible means which control 
natural dispositions (ṭabā’i‘).65  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
64 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 211. 
 
65 Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 212.  
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 Conclusion  
Major Islamic philosophers seem to have all confirmed an active role for human 
agency in causing changes in the world through praying. On the other hand, they have all 
considered the efficacy of prayers in harmony with divine providence. Nevertheless, 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on this metaphysical harmony, though appearing to be the same as 
his predecessors, has a unique character due to its dependence on a different 
cosmological framework within which causality takes a position between the pluralistic 
realism of Ibn Sīnā and the existential monism of Ibn ‘Arabī.66 Mullā Ṣadrā’s follows an 
organic approach in the light of the unity of all realities in being. The present paper has 
focused on this approach in order to show that for Mullā Ṣadrā, prayer has a real 
influence as a link between the macrocosm and microcosm due to the continuity between 
different levels of being.  
Classical Islamic philosophy explains the causal relation between the created beings 
and the Giver of being based on necessary/contingent dualism. The world is the effect of 
and dependent on the First Cause in almost the same way that the agent’s actions (as 
accidents) depend on her as a substance. According to Ibn Sīnā, "nothing comes into 
                                                          
66 Mullā Ṣadrā's philsophy is based on the primacy of being (aṣālat al-wujūd). The 
most systematic explanation of the primacy of being appears in al-Mashā‘ir. See the 
annotated edition of it by Seyyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī in Mullā Muḥammad Ja‘far Lāhījī, 
Sharḥ risālat al-mashā‘ir Mullā Ṣadrā, ed. Seyyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Qum: Būstān-i 
kītāb, 1386 sh.), 163-207. For a useful introduction to al-Mashā‘ir, see Henry Corbin, 
introduction to Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques = Kitāb al-mashā‘ir by Ṣadr al-
Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī, trans. Henry Corbin (Paris: Verdier, 1988). For the 
most recenent annnotated translation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s al-Mashā‘ir, see Muḥammad b. 
Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, The book of metaphysical penetrations: a parallel English-
Arabic text, trans. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, annot. İbrahim Kalın.  2014. 
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existence unless its existence is necessitated."67 Mullā Ṣadrā is critical of this existential 
gap and, by way of objection to his past masters, says that "they have argued for a second 
being, trying to prove existence for the contingent next to the Being of the Real (al-
Ḥaqq)."68 For Mullā Ṣadrā, 
The effect is not another thing next to its cause, and the mind cannot point 
to the identity of the effect separately from the cause…the mind can, 
however, think of the quiddity of the effect separately but we already know 
that the real effect is being not quiddity. Now it is clear that the existence of 
the effect, which is not complete in its identity, is only existent with regard 
to its relation to the cause. Apart from the One Transcendent Reality, every 
being is only a ray of the Light of His very Being…He is the Real and the rest 
are His manifestations. He is the Light and the rest are the streaks of that 
Light.69 
 
Nevertheless, the relational (rabṭī) state of the created world does not imply its 
illusoriness for Mullā Ṣadrā. Everything in the world including the immaterial and 
material, substantial and accidental are relational in the sense that in their reality they 
are only manifestations of the One who is Absolute (muṭlaq) and Independent (mustaqil). 
Far from being illusions, the manifestations are different grades and intensities of the 
same reality, i.e. being. "The doctrine of gradation not only supports the reality of 
diversity, but also points out the all-encompassing simplicity of being qua being."70 
                                                          
67 Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-najāt, 262.  
 
68 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘ālīya, 1:330. 
 
69 Lāhījī, Sharḥ risālat al-mashā‘ir Mullā Ṣadrā, 450. This quotation and the one 
before it are translated by Meisami, Mulla Sadra, 39-40. 
 
70 Sayeh Meisami, "Mulla Sadra," in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October 
2013, http://www.iep.utm.edu/sadra/ (accessed April 10, 2014). on the tension between 
monism and pluralism, see Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, 120-
4. Bonmariage, Le réel et les réalités: Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī et la structure de la réalité, 139-
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According to Mullā Ṣadrā, "the Simple Reality (al-basiṭ al-ḥaqīqa) is all things but none of 
those things in particular." 71  
This metaphysical paradox of diversity in unity is the background against which 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of prayer can be best understood. The above mentioned doctrine 
of the existential dependence on the part of the beings in the world as relational, together 
with the gradational reality of those beings form a conceptual framework within which 
Mullā Ṣadrā tries to solve problems in areas where philosophy and theology overlap. One 
of the most significant issues of this type is the nature of the God-world relationship. As 
we have seen so far in this paper, the efficacy of prayer is related to the God-world 
relationship and Mullā Ṣadrā’s answer to the problems that rise from attesting to this 
efficacy is based on his view of the dynamics of that relationship.   
As discussed in the paper, every action associated with a free agent, though 
dependent on the will of God, also possesses a degree of reality just like every being is a 
flash of the light of God. It is in this context that the Qur’anic verse (8:17) can be 
interpreted not as the dismissal of human action, but as regarding human agency as a 
degree of the Absolute agency of God.72 Along the same lines, the efficacy of prayer is 
appreciated in its own right as a flame from the fire of the divine act. For Mullā Ṣadrā, to 
                                                          
71 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 6:111. For more on this doctrine, see Ghulām 
Ḥossein Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, Qawā‘id-i falsafa-yi islāmī, 3 vols. (Tehran: Mu’assasa-yi 
muṭāla‘āt wa taḥqīqāt-i farhangī, 1370 sh.), 1:108-15. 
 
72 "It is not ye who slew them; it was Allah: when thou threwest (a handful of dust), it 
was not thy act, but Allah’s: in order that He might test the Believers by a gracious trial 
from Himself: for Allah is He Who heareth and knoweth (all things)" (8:17). Abdullah Yusuf 
Ali, trans,  
http://www.searchtruth.com/chapter_display.php?chapter=8&translator=2&mac=  
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be existentially dependent on God would not contradict the reality of beings; nor would it 
contradict the reality of our wills, wishes, and actions.  
With the above in mind, I can now summarize Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on prayer in 
terms of its dual effect on the inner and outer worlds: Prayer as the invocation of the 
human soul to higher ranks of existence can be effective in the sense of diverting the 
course of natural events to a particular direction desired by the soul. The will to change is 
not wayward but inspired by the heavenly souls to the benefit of the world at large. 
However, the relationship between the human and the heavenly souls is not a one-way 
relation; nor can we interpret the heavenly inspiration as a mechanical inculcation of 
ideas with the human soul having a merely instrumental role. Rather, the relationship is 
mutual owing to the existential parallelism between the imaginative forms of the two 
realms. This is made possible owing to the substantial evolution of the soul through 
which the faculty of imagination gains the power to create imaginative forms that 
correspond to the imaginal entities of the spiritual realm. The human soul also has the 
power to cause changes in the material world. While the result of change in this case is to 
be distinguished from the creation of imaginative forms by the imaginative faculty, the 
process is similarly based on the existential correspondence between two grades of 
being, that is, the sensible forms created by the faculty of sensation parallel to the 
substantial forms which are bestowed on matter by the heavenly souls.   
Thus, for Mullā Ṣadrā the creative power of the human soul is the key to the efficacy 
of prayer. Like spirituality (rūḥāniyyat) itself, creativity is only potential in the beginning 
and needs to be actualized once the soul reaches the high stages of her substantial 
evolution. Naturally, only certain souls manage to reach such heights including prophets, 
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Imams and awliyā as previously explained. On the other hand, the prayer is not only 
efficacious when originating in great souls, but also it has the power to help the process of 
existential advancement by increasing the average soul in humbleness and directing her 
attention towards the spiritual domain above.  
 
 
 
 
